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Problematizing Competence in Clinical Legal Education:  
What do we mean by competence and how do we assess non-skill 
competencies? 
Donald Nicolson1* 
University of Strathclyde, UK. 
 
Techniques without ideals is a menace; ideals without techniques are a mess. 
Karl Lewellyn (1952) 
INTRODUCTION 
The special issue of this journal is about problematizing assessment. However, in 
this article I want to start further back and problematize what is meant by 
competence. I think it is fair to say that when law clinicians speak about assessing 
competence they usually have in mind the assessment of skills. By contrast, I will 
argue that competence goes well beyond skills, at least if we understand skills in the 
narrow sense of technical legal skills, and includes in addition a values dimension. 
Moreover, if this dimension is added to the notion of skills, and clinical legal 
education (CLE) is expanded to include an understanding of how lawyers skills are 
used, for whom and to what end, it might help reverse the traditional and still 
continuing antipathy in many law schools to CLE. For those like myself, who see law 
clinics as more about contributing to social justice than legal education (Nicolson 
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2006), the reluctance to embrace CLE is rooted (rightly or wrongly) in a political and 
moral stance. But for most academics, the antipathy - or, at best, apathy - towards 
CLE might be more to do with its association with skills training and the consequent 
assumption that it is unintellectual, unfit for the lofty heights of a liberal legal 
education and thus best left for the grubby business of preparing lawyers for 
practice (see eg Bradney 1995, 2003, Brownsword, 1999; Guth & Ashford, 2014).  
To the extent that CLE is confined to training students in legal skills, I have some 
sympathy with this view, though its questionable whether skills training is any less 
intellectual than the sort of repetitive, decontextualised and atheoretical teaching of 
black-letter law which often passes for a liberal legal education. However, in a recent 
article (Nicolson 2015), I joined a number of others who have argued that there is 
nothing necessarily anti-intellectual about a focus on practice in a liberal legal 
education. Thus, like Goldsmith and Bamford, I do not see engagement with practice 
in purely vocational or technocratic terms, but as providing opportunities for 
connecting the aspirations of law students with professional ideals (justice, service, 
fairness) and the goals of a university-based education (Goldsmith and Bamford 
2010, p. 163; see also Goldsmith 1999, 2002; Boon 1998, 166).  
In this article, I first flesh out this argument and justify the focus on ethical as well as 
skills competence in clinical legal education. I then turn from problematizing the 
concept of competence per se to problematizing its assessment. This will be done via 
a critical analysis of the forms of assessment used in the clinical programme offered 
in the University of Strathclyde Law Clinic (henceforth, the USLC). These include the 
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assessment of simulated training exercises, work on actual cases, reflective essays on 
aspects of law, legal ethics and laws justice and reflective diaries on all aspects of 
clinical experience. Drawing on my experience with these different forms of 
assessment, I will consider their comparative merits in contributing to the two classic 
goals of clinic assessment, namely reliability  whether the scores obtained from an 
assessment are reproducible - and validity - whether the assessment does in fact 
measure what it is intended to measure (van der Vleuten and Schuwirth 2005). 
Finally, drawing on the assessment regimes in the relevant clinical classes, I will seek 
to provide some food for thought about alternative means of assessing clinical 
teaching.  
 
PROBLEMATISING THE NOTION OF COMPETENCY 
Most people think of competent lawyers as those who are knowledgeable and 
technically skilled at using law in the service of clients.  Assessment of competence is 
thus not made in terms of ethics and values - indeed they suggest a perceived 
mutual exclusion of technical and ethical competencies. Such a dichotomy is, 
however, both dangerous and false.  It can be seen to be dangerous when we ask 
ourselves the question  do we really want lawyers who are highly  skilled at 
achieving client goals when it is those with power and money who can afford such 
lawyers, while their opponents either have lawyers who are overworked and 
underfunded or have no lawyers at all?  
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The dichotomy between skills and values is, in addition, false because lawyers with 
ethical competency may in fact be more effective lawyers than those who are merely 
technically competent. Indeed, this is at least implicitly recognised by those (cf 
Chavkin, 2003-4, 254) who seek to train students in client-centered lawyering (see eg 
Binder, Bergman, & Price 1991) in that always seeking clients informed consent to 
actions on their behalf helps to promote their autonomy and avoids the paternalism 
which is inherent in more traditional approaches to client relations in which lawyers 
make all decisions about how to achieve client ends (see eg Nicolson and Webb, ch 
5). Ostensibly, the traditional approach leaves clients free to set their own ends, but 
this means-ends distinction is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons.  
One is the fact that power and (at least, assumed) knowledge asymmetries between 
lawyer and client may encourage the latter to defer to the former on issues regarding 
ends as well as means, especially if clients interpret a lawyers suggestions as to 
what they should seek to achieve as technical advice. Another reason is that some 
decisions as to means might be so significant that the client really should take them 
rather than the lawyer. For instance, the most effective means to win a child access 
dispute might be to attack the opposing parents character but - and especially if this 
is done using information provided by the client  - this might not accord with the 
clients best interests or even his or her wishes (let alone those of the children), given 
that they are likely to benefit from an ongoing amicable relationship with the 
opposing parent. But even under the client-centered approach, unless they are 
exposed to the full range of issues relevant to the issue of paternalism, students 
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might not become aware of their ability to sway clients even while affording them 
the power to decide (see eg Ellman 1987). This may occur through decisions as to 
which of the (sometimes myriad) options on offer to put to the client, the way that 
the choice of alternatives are structured and/or merely by tone of voice in presenting 
options (Simon 1991).  
Improved client service can also be achieved by challenging the standard conception 
of lawyers role morality in terms of which lawyers are expected to pursue their 
clients goals irrespective of how immoral they might be or how immoral the means 
to those goals. Such a stance  often called that of neutral partisanship (see eg 
Nicolson and Webb 1999, ch 6) not only poses dangers for opponents, third parties 
or the public interest, but arguably it may also result in inferior services to the client. 
If lawyers see issues of morality as off-limits, they will not engage their clients in 
what ethicists call a moral dialogue in which they explore whether certain courses of 
action are moral and can justifiably be pursued. Such moral dialogue is not just a 
necessary component of what is called moral activism (see Nicolson and Webb, ch 
8), as opposed to neutral partisanship, but it may provide a better service to the 
client. For instance, in one case the USLC was acting for a trainee solicitor made 
redundant by a law firm while pregnant. She mentioned in passing that the same 
partner responsible for this decision has been accused of sexual harassment. But 
instead of just going ahead to use this information as a bargaining chip, having 
studied ethics, the student asked the client how she felt about using this information 
and surprisingly learnt that she was not prepared to stoop to using this dirty trick 
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(see Nicolson 2010 for this and other examples; Aiken, 2000-1, 304 for a similar 
example).  
Encouraging students to abandon the stance of neutral partisanship may also lead to 
more empathetic and zealous services for those who do not have the financial 
resources to buy maximum lawyer zeal. There is a strong argument (see Nicolson 
and Webb, 1999, ch 6) that neutral partisanship leads to moral detachment, in terms of 
which lawyers seek to psychologically distance themselves from their moral feelings 
and beliefs. But this can be argued to hamper the development of the Aristotelian 
quality of phronesis (practical wisdom), in terms of the lessons of past experience equip 
lawyers to instinctively know how to respond to practical and ethical issues which 
arise in practice. According to Postema, phronesis is rooted in ordinary moral beliefs, 
attitudes, feelings and relationships (1980, 78; see further Postema, 1980, 68ff; 
Postema, 1983, 306ff) and is extremely useful in professional contexts where novel 
situations arise (see also Kronman, 1987 and 1993). Moral detachment may also hamper 
effective lawyering in the sense that moral arguments may play important roles in legal 
argumentation (cf Postema, 1980, 79). Lawyers who have shut off their moral faculties 
are less able to manufacture such arguments than are those with deep moral 
sentiments.  
The neutrality aspect of neutral partisanship may also undermine the principle of 
partisanship with requires lawyers to represent their clients zealously. While written 
discourses on professional legal ethics certainly encourage lawyers to exercise the 
utmost zeal, the rules allow them a broad discretion to exercise greater or lesser zeal 
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(Nicolson and Webb 1999, ch 6). Such zeal can be so fierce as to run the risk of 
breaching professional norms on proper behaviour, or it can be so minimal as to 
come close to incompetence. However, according to the neutral partisanship 
conception and its allied strategy of moral detachment, the question as to how much 
zeal lawyers should exercise in particular cases ought not to be answered by 
considerations of morality. 
Moreover, with the shutting down of moral feeling may also come a shutting down of 
related feelings of empathy, sympathy and concern. Having detached themselves from 
moral sentiments, lawyers can no longer see clients in their full humanity. The lawyer 
becomes interested only in that part of the client that lies within his or her special 
competency (Wasserstrom, 1975, 21). The plight of clients and the possibility of them 
possessing the moral high-ground are unlikely to lawyers who come to see clients as 
the divorce, the taking without owners consent or no.20, Queens Road. This 
situation is given bathetic force by the comment of Paul Hill, one of the Guildford Four 
who spent years in jail following his wrongful conviction for murder, that he got the 
impression that any of our barristers could easily have...taken over the running of the 
prosecution.(Stolen Years (with Ronan Bennet), 1990, 126, quoted in Pannick, 1992, 
132.) 
Having detached themselves from feelings of morality and humanity, it is likely 
lawyers will ration zeal according to more material considerations: by the clients 
status, whether they are one-off or regular clients, by the need to maintain salubrious 
relationships with those with whom they regularly deal, etc, but above all by their 
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ability to pay. A lawyers time and energy are not infinite and given the pressures to 
provide legal services as a profitable business, money is likely to be the quid pro quo 
for zeal, and the more quid, the more pro. 
We thus see that the competent lawyer is also an ethical lawyer who displays both 
technical competence and a concern for values. Ethics have a role to play in 
providing a good service to the client  including care, consideration and respect for 
clients autonomy (as well as maintaining confidentiality and acting in their best 
interests). In this first sense, it is not too much of a stretch to see these attributes as 
matters of lawyering skills in that the good lawyer is not just technically skilful but 
has what might be called personal or even emotional skills.   
However, the importance of ethics also has a second, wider (if you like, public as 
opposed to private) dimension. Thus, it can be argued that the good lawyer is not 
just good at their job. They are also good in their job (or just good full stop) in the 
sense of being aware of the wider moral dimension of being a lawyer. They are not 
simple amoral technicians prepared to do everything legal and not prohibited by 
their professional codes for their clients, but take account of the harm they might do 
to others, to the legal system and to the public interest.  
Before looking at the role of law clinics in helping to develop this wider conception 
of competence, it must be stressed that even an expanded notion of competence 
which goes beyond knowledge, skills and ethics in the sense discussed above, does 
not go far enough because it does not extend to what I see as perhaps the most 
important ethical value. This is the sense of obligation to ensure that competent and 
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ethical services are not just received by those with enough money to pay for them or 
fortunate enough to qualify for the constantly shrinking legal aid pot. As I have 
recently argued (Nicolson 2013, 2015), notions of reciprocity or gratitude towards the 
community which through its taxes pays for school education and, still in Scotland, 
for much of the cost of legal education suggest that lawyers have a moral obligation 
to contribute in some way to enhancing access to justice. Public investment in their 
education enables law students to enjoy substantial financial rewards. However, 
only those fortunate enough to afford lawyers or qualify for legal aid benefit from 
this investment. Moreover, a major obstacle to access to justice is the high fees 
charged by lawyers. Consequently, it can be argued that these lawyers have a moral 
duty to take some remedial action to repay those who helped put them in their 
privileged position, but do not benefit from this investment. Two further arguments 
support a moral obligation on lawyers to enhance access to justice. One is that their 
earnings are partly  albeit decreasingly  protected by state limitations on who can 
practice law and access legal processes. Secondly, many access to justice problems, 
especially of a relative nature, stem from often unnecessary and difficult to 
understand legal complexities created by lawyers serving their clients (and 
indirectly themselves by making legal assistance more necessary). Here, lawyers can 
be said to have a moral obligation to help remedy the resultant access to justice 
obstacles.  
Indeed, by analogy with Rawlss argument that [j]ustice is the first virtue of social 
institutions (Rawls, 1999, 3), it can be argued that the first virtue of the ethical 
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lawyer is to ensure access to justice. It seems obvious to me that ethically aware 
lawyers who either devote their career to those most in need of legal services or 
provide pro bono legal services are an improvement on those who provide ethically 
aware services to the shrinking group of those who can afford to pay or obtain legal 
aid. In addition, the goal of making practitioners aware of problems with neutral 
partisanship, confidentiality, conflicts and client autonomy is undermined where 
their scope for moral manoeuvre is highly constrained by financial considerations 
which cast morality as an unaffordable luxury or where responsibility for ethics 
tends to fall into the cracks because of the increasing specialisation of legal work or 
completely out of sight because of its increasing routinisation (see Nicolson and 
Webb, 1999, ch. 3).  
Accordingly, while it is difficult to stretch the concept of values-based competence to 
include the notion of an altruistic duty to enhance access to justice (except by 
unrealistically stretching the concept of competence to something like altruistic 
competence), I would argue that we are failing in our role as educators if we do not 
give due weight to this aspect of being a good lawyer. 
 
THE GOALS OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 
Having problematized the notion of competence, I turn now to the possible role 
clinical legal education may have in instilling this expanded sense of competence 
and the expanded notion of the good lawyer. Van der Vleuten and Schuwirth 
correctly argue that choosing assessment always involves compromises (2005), but 
10 
 
Special Issue: Problematising Assessment in Clinical Legal Education  
 
the same applies to CLE. Broadly speaking, CLE can be designed to serve four broad 
goals:  
x skills development, both in narrow technical and broader values-infused 
sense; 
x teaching substantive law in context; 
x ethical education  sensitising students to issues of legal ethics, providing 
them with the relevant tools to resolve them, and hopefully also encouraging 
them to care about being ethical and developing the moral courage to resist 
competing pressures (see generally Nicolson, 2008); 
x ensuring justice readiness  exposing students to social and legal injustice, 
including inequalities in access to justice and helping them to understand its 
causes and to care about addressing these causes (see Aiken, 2012; Wizner 
and Aiken, 2004; Nicolson 2015). 
If all law teaching was conducted clinically, then it might be possible to achieve and 
give equal weight to all four goals, but resource implications mean that most law 
schools restrict clinical legal education to a term or two, and/or only to a limited 
number of students. This restricts what can be achieved. Consequently, most 
clinicians need to make choices as to which of the goals to prioritise when they clash. 
For instance, if ones goal is to maximise justice readiness then exposing students to 
as many vulnerable clients as possible broadens their perspectives on the injustice of 
the world they live in and the extent to which law is either unable to rectify these 
injustices or is even responsible for them. Thus, drawing on educational theory, 
many clinicians claim that student exposure to clients may cause disorienting 
moments (Quigley, 1995) whereby their pre-existing assumptions about the world 
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clash with their observation of social deprivation, unequal access to justice and 
substantive legal injustice. Moreover, when the experience is that of someone in dire 
need and it is realised that they may have no source of assistance, knowledge may be 
transformed into empathetic care and hopefully into a commitment to enhance 
access to justice on graduation. However, for these insights to go deep, exposure to 
the problems of social and legal injustice need to be repeated - with the greater the 
exposure the more varied are the problems students will encounter and the more 
they will realise that these problems are endemic rather than exceptional (Aiken, 
1997; Wizner, 2000-1; Nicolson, 2008; Brodie, 2008-9). Clinics with a high volume of 
cases are thus better suited to ensuring justice readiness. By contrast, if the focus is 
on skills development (and possibly also substantive law teaching), students will 
benefit from a close relationship with clinic supervisors who can guide their learning 
and skills development and allow them to experiment with different ways of 
practising law so that they can help them to learn from their mistakes as they make 
them. This is why the Clinical Legal Education Organisation suggests a staff-student 
ratio of 1: 12 (CLEO, 1995, cited in Brayne, Duncan and Grimes 1998, 120-135), while 
the average in US is between 1:6 to 1:10 (McDiarmid 1990, 254-55) 
At the USCL, however, we have a ratio of around 1:150! This is largely because most 
students involvement is voluntary. In fact, while the Law School wanted the clinic 
to be used for teaching the Diploma in Professional Legal Practice, I insisted that it 
be offered primarily to undergraduates and solely on an extra-curricular basis. At 
the time, I had a number of reasons for insisting on an extra-curricular clinic which 
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prioritised enhancing social justice over legal education (see Nicolson, 2006), though 
these were not as thought through as they are now.  
x Perhaps the most immediate was the concern, prompted by the apparent 
experience of other UK clinics, that students might abandon clients or de-
prioritise their needs once they have received the required credit for their 
work. 
x Closely related to this, was the worry that the prioritisation of legal education 
over serving the community by the law clinic itself and its staff conveys an 
implicit message to students that their interests - now education, later 
commercial - trump those of clients and the community. In my view, there is 
also something inherently morally problematic about practising law on the 
poor (rather than for the poor)  even if the latter do benefit from such 
practice.  
x More recently, I have formed the view that all those who benefit from legal 
education  including those who make their living by teaching law - have a 
moral obligation to ensure that these benefits extend to all in society, not just 
to those who can afford lawyers fees or qualify for legal aid (see Nicolson 
2013, 2015). Students can volunteer to provide free legal services to those in 
need while at university and subsequently either continue to volunteer or 
better still devote their career to assisting the most vulnerable rather than the 
most wealthy in society. Staff can help run or support law clinics and/or 
sensitise students through their teaching to issues of unmet legal need, and 
wider legal social and injustice.  
This last point shows that law clinics can play both a direct and indirect role in 
promoting justice: directly by providing legal services to those most in need; and 
indirectly by developing in students a commitment to do so after graduation or at 
least sustaining a pre-existing commitment to do so (see Nicolson 2006, 2010). 
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Moreover, if both these roles are going to be maximised, then it follows that clinics 
should seek to maximise both the number of students involved and the length of 
their involvement. More students mean more cases or other forms of community 
service (law reform work, street law, etc). And the longer the student involvement, 
the greater their exposure to both the problems of justice and the satisfaction of 
helping others, and hence, according to educational theory (Nicolson 2006), the 
greater the possibility of them developing the habit of helping others. Obviously, 
these two desiderata are in conflict - all things being equal, increasing the number of 
students involved means that the involvement of each students will be reduced, and 
vice versa. At USLC we balance these two considerations by providing places for 
about a third of all undergraduates to serve in the clinic for the duration of their 
studies (anything from three to five years for full-time students). Thus, we currently 
have 280 clinic students (though only 225 are trained to engage in face to face client 
work as opposed to online advice, law reform, public legal education and 
investigating alleged miscarriages of justice).  
However, after the USLCs launch in 2003, I gradually came to realise that its entirely 
extra-curricular nature meant that it was not fully realising the potential of its 
justice mission. This was not so less so as regards the more direct means of 
enhancing justice through providing legal services to those most in need. In order to 
maintain the quality and not just the quantity of service to the community, students 
undertake intensive induction training, have all letters, pleadings and other 
documents and case strategies checked and are encouraged to attend regular 
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optional training sessions on substantive areas of law and advanced skills like body 
language interpretation and dealing with vulnerable clients. And it seems to work  
over the last few years over 90% of cases going beyond mere advice led to client 
goals being fully or partly met.  
On the other hand, reference to the CLE literature (eg Aiken 2000-1;Wizner & Aiken, 
2004; Adcock 2013) suggested to me that without a teaching programme, the USLC 
was not meeting its potential as regards the indirect means of enhancing justice 
through educating students to be justice ready (cf Aiken 2012). According to 
educational theory, the value of all forms of experiential learning lies, not just in the 
experience of putting knowledge into practice, but also in the reflection on that 
activity. As is so well-put in Brayne, Duncan and Grimes, learning from experience 
occurs not in the doing but in the reflection and conceptualisation that takes place 
during and after the event. (1998, 47). For instance, according to Kolbs well-known 
learning circle (see eg Kolb, 1984), reflection may lead to the adoption of new, or the 
adaptation of existing, theories about how to handle issues which can then be put 
into practice when similar situations arise. It helps build the skills, values and 
modes of critical thinking required to frame and solve complex problems. (Casey, 
2013-14, 320).  
Reflection can be unconscious and subliminal (Calmore, 2003-4, 1172). But it is likely 
to be more profound and long-lasting if time is set aside for the process and 
reflection is guided by the views of others, especially those experienced in the 
relevant activity or steeped in the relevant theoretical knowledge (Morin and 
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Waysdorf, 2013, 606). Such guidance can be provided via feedback on written 
reflection or face to face in supervision meetings or in those attended by colleagues 
as well as teachers where all provide feedback, ask questions and make suggestions 
and generally deepen the dialogue (what some call reflection circles": Morin and 
Waysdorf, 2013). Conscious reflection is also likely to be taken more seriously if 
assessed and particularly if this is done for marks (Van Tartwijk & Driessen 2009).  
 
Clinical Legal Education and Assessment at the University of Strathclyde 
I only discovered the value of experiential learning after establishing a clinical class 
as a reward to final year clinic students for their voluntary work. It was initially 
called Clinical Legal Practice, and involved a mixture of classes by practitioners on 
advanced clinical skills and classes on legal ethics and access to justice, but slowly 
the skills elements were dropped both because the students took to the other aspects 
especially legal ethics which they had never encountered and because of the 
difficulties discussed below with assessing skills through case work. Thus case work 
assessment was dropped in favour of greater emphasis on student reflection in a 
weekly diary on issues of ethics and justice arising in their cases, clinical experience 
more generally and in class seminars, and on a reflective essay in which students 
explore in more depth the issues arising in one of their cases. As a result of the 
shifted emphasis, the class was renamed Ethics and Justice. 
However, the experience of seeing students integrate reflection and background 
reading on issues of ethics and justice persuaded me about the value of experiential 
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learning as the best means of teaching ethics and seeing its potential to strengthen 
the indirect impact of clinics on social justice through fostering and sustaining 
warriors for justice (Nicolson, 2015). By not formalising what students learn from 
their case experience, I realised I was wasting valuable educational opportunities as 
regards ethics and justice teaching. No doubt the same applies to exploiting clinic 
work to develop skills and teach substantive law. However, I am not convinced that 
the academic stage of legal training should  be required to produce practice-ready 
lawyers. Otherwise, there would have to be the resources to provide all students, 
many of whom will not go on to practice, with enough clinical and reflective 
opportunities to fully develop their skills. By contrast, not least because this task is 
not currently being carried out at the professional stage of legal training, I do think 
that it is the job of law schools to strive to make students justice-ready or, to put it in 
the language of liberal legal education, to help develop good citizens (eg 
Brownsword 1999). If successful, this will mean that those who do enter practice, 
will do so willing and able to contribute to redressing social injustice and practice in 
an ethically informed way. As stated earlier, I do not favour producing highly 
skilled and knowledgeable lawyers if those attributes are reserved for those who can 
afford to pay and used to cause even more social injustice on behalf of the powerful 
in society.  
But as also stated earlier, I was also initially concerned that providing students with 
credit for their clinic work would lead to them prioritising education and assessment 
marks over social justice and clients thus undermining the contrary message 
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conveyed by the USLCs goals of directly and indirectly enhancing social justice. 
However, after being in operation for a number of years I was convinced that the 
USLCs strong social justice orientation was being passed on from one generation of 
students to the next through an appointments procedure, supervision, mentoring 
and informal socialisation. As long as this ethos remained and participation was 
largely extra-curricular, I became confident it would be possible to maximise the 
potential for students to learn about ethics and justice from their raw clinic 
experience without undermining the clinics message about social justice. 
 Consequently, from October 2011, Strathclyde law students have had the 
option of enrolling on a Clinical LLB (CLLB), albeit only if they first gain admission 
to the USLC through an interview which assesses their commitment to social justice. 
The CLLB integrates and assesses students clinical training, case work and reflection 
on their clinical and educational experiences. It is not a totally separate degree to the 
standard Strathclyde LLB. Instead, students take all the standard LLB classes except 
for Law and Society which is replaced by Legal Theory (thus negating any 
suggestion that CLE is anti-intellectual). However, at least a third of the classes taken 
by CLLB students must have a clinical element. Four of these are compulsory:  
x Legal Methods (Clinical) adds training basic legal skills (client interviewing, 
letter writing, case and data management) as well as an introduction to legal 
ethics to the standard legal methods class;  
x Voluntary Obligations (Clinical) augments the standard contract class with 
training in the skills of advanced legal research, negotiation, advocacy and 
pleadings drafting in the second semester of the first year;  
18 
 
Special Issue: Problematising Assessment in Clinical Legal Education  
 
x Ethics and Justice, taken in the first semester of the final year, involves the 
renamed Clinical Legal Practice class; 
x The new Clinical Legal Practice does not involve any teaching but gives 
students marks for case performance and for reflective diaries which they 
must write in the second and third years of the CLLB.   
In addition students must take at least two2 clinically available classes. These are 
standard compulsory or optional classes whose subject areas are likely to arise in 
clinical cases. Where a student has a case relevant to one of the clinically available 
classes they can opt to replace a portion of the assessment for the standard class with 
an essay in which they explore the legal, practical, factual, ethical, justice and/or 
political issues arising in one or more of their past or current clinical cases. 
Thus, apart from the various forms of assessment in the standard LLB, the CLLB has 
a variety of forms of assessment, both in terms of what is being assessed and the 
manner in which it is assessed. The rest of this section will provide a critical 
evaluation of each in turn.   
1. General Skills  Case Performance 
One obvious, but as I shall argue, problematic form of assessment involves 
performance in case work. Thus, 50% of the mark for the compulsory Clinical Legal 
Practice course is devoted to assessment of the students performance in five of their 
cases. Where, as is usually the case, students have conducted more than five, they 
2 Or one if they are doing the two-year accelerated version taken by non-law graduates. To avoid 
undue complexity in the following discussion, I will henceforth only refer to the standard three year 
CLLB. In addition most of those taking the latter degree will go onto an Honours year where they 
take at least another two clinical classes and/or write a dissertation on a clinical topic. 
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will choose which to have assessed. Given that the CLLB is aimed at integrating 
clinical training and experiential learning into the law degree, it seems to make sense 
to assess students on what they have learnt from their training, supervision and 
reflection on how to conduct cases.  
Assessing casework, however, raises three problems in my view. The first is that it is 
difficult to specify the standard against which students are being marked (see 
Appendix A for an attempt to do so). This might arguably be a general problem of 
putting conventionally accepted academic standards into marking schemes in order 
to guide their behaviour of students. However, having marked for years with other 
colleagues at a number of institutions, being subjected to externals and having acted 
as an external at different institutions, I am fairly confident about the consistence of 
my judgment of academic work (though only about the consistency with other 
markers when we have jointly marked over a number of years).  Consequently, I 
now rarely refer to marking schemes and am pretty sure that such references 
functions more at the level of justification rather than discovery of the correct 
mark. But marking according to conventions within a particular marking 
community is infinitely more difficult, if not impossible, in regard to assessing case 
performance for three reasons: 
x There are usually few clinicians involved in marking within any one 
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x There is also relatively speaking a much smaller clinical educators community 
in the UK and certainly in Scotland, as compared with the US, Australia and 
South Africa, for instance. 
x It is difficult if not impossible to get appropriate moderation or even feedback 
from other supervisors and from externals on the marks allocated to a 
particular case if as is certainly the case with externals, they have not been 
involved in observation of the case performance.  
Colleagues and externals can of course review the written file, but not any other 
aspects of case performance. This highlights two other main problems with assessing 
case performance. The first is that, unless the supervisor attends every single client 
interview, negotiation and court appearance (which in my view would lead to an 
unwelcome reduction in the quantity of clients served), they cannot assess overall 
case performance except in terms of how successful the outcome was. Even then, 
there may be no way of knowing whether this was due to luck or the students 
ability when the case was successful and whether the student still performed well 
despite a disappointing result. Given this difficulty, students who keep an 
impeccable file and produce impressive documents may get a high mark despite an 
otherwise poor performance, and vice versa. 
This obviously leads to arbitrariness in marking  a problem exacerbated by the 
huge role fate plays in terms of what sort of cases are allocated to students. Thus, 
cases allocated to students range from the very simple, when clients need only to be 
interviewed and given advice on simple matters to month-long disputes ending in 
litigation and even an appeal. How does one compare the perfect performance of a 
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few simple tasks with the competent, but inevitably not entirely perfect, 
performance in a case involving complex law, procedure and facts, well-resourced 
professionally legally represented opponents prepared to pull every trick in the book 
to win, and a possibly fractious court? To some extent one can apply a tariff 
approach as in sports like diving where simple dives performed perfectly do not 
receive full marks but very difficult dives can still get high marks despite not being 
perfect. But it seems unfair not to give full marks to students who do a perfect job 
given that they have no choice in what cases they receive.   
One could of course abandon marking case performance and merely ascribe a 
satisfactory/unsatisfactory judgment to performance. But this would be unfair under 
current CLLB rules because one unsatisfactory decision would mean that the student 
fails Clinical Legal Practice and cannot graduate until they can gain another case and 
perform to a satisfactory basis. It also seems unfair not to reward students who have 
put in an enormous effort to assist clients in a caring and competent fashion. 
Accordngly, students tend to get very high marks for case performance, leading to 
high overall marks for Clinical Legal Practice and eyebrows being raised at 
examination boards!  
Admittedly, the significance of these problems is reduced by the fact that the mark 
for case performance is limited to only 1/36th of their assessment for the CLLB (they 
take six classes each year)  or even 1/48th if they go on to the Honours year (where 
another six classes are taken). Moreover, the extent of the problems of idiosyncratic 
case performance and the role of fate in obtaining cases, as well as the lesser problem 
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of variance in marking standards between different markers,3 is reduced by the fact 
that students are assessed on their performance in five rather than one or two cases 
and hence disparities tend to even themselves out to some extent.  
2. Specific Skills  Simulated Exercises 
Nevertheless, I remain very ambivalent about marking case performance in live 
cases. I feel far more comfortable about marking performance in simulated exercises, 
even though live cases are likely to provide deeper (albeit less controlled) learning 
experiences than simulated ones. I am also persuaded, at least in theory, by van der 
Vleuten and Schuwirths argument that it is better to assess overall performance 
involving a variety of skills than the separate assessment of discrete skills (2005, 312-
13). In practice, however, it seems easier and fairer to assess carefully controlled 
simulated exercises involving one or only a few skills. And this is what we do in the 
initial two classes in the CLLB.  
In Legal Methods (Clinical) a statement of facts based on a simulated interview are 
each given a mark out of five, with a further five marks for reflection on the client 
interview (rather than for performance of the interview itself)4 and fifteen marks for 
a report on ethical issues arising out of the interview (the remaining 75% of the 
assessment comprising an assignment testing standard legal methods issues). In 
3 Cf Govaerts, Van der Vleuten, & Schuwirth, 2002, 139-40 whose study suggests that students vary in 
case performance far more than markers vary in assessment performance and hence that being 
assessed on multiple cases reduces problems with both.  
4 This is because students interview in pairs but such pairs often involve a mix of CLLB and non-
CLLB students, meaning that they cannot be marked as a pair or individually. Plans are however 
being made to get round this problem and to assess performance rather than reflection, given that 
reflection on an interview tends to be rather formulaic and unrevealing. 
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Voluntary Obligations (Clinical), the 50% of class assessment devoted to clinical 
training comprise of: an in-depth research exercise on the sort of contractual issues 
that arise in clinic cases (25%); the drafting of pleadings based on the research (10%); 
and participation in either a simulated negotiation or advocacy exercise based on the 
same case (15%). Compared to the assessment of general case performance, we are 
able to give quite specific guidance on what is expected, can ensure fairness between 
students because of the simulated nature of the exercise and can ensure moderation 
by colleagues and externals as all exercises are either written or video-recorded. The 
only slight concern is that, once again, students tend to do better in such practical 
exercises, though this is offset by the fact that the clinical assessments replace aspects 
of the standard classes in which students also tend to do well.  
3. Learning about Law - Reflective Essays 
For their clinically available classes, students write an essay on a topic based on a 
relevant ongoing or past case which they set in consultation with me as the CLLB 
Director. Here, assessment guidelines are broad5 because the idea is that the students 
take an issue or issues which they find interesting, challenging, surprising and/or on 
which they have already done some detailed research and would like to do more. In 
5 For instance, the Legal Process (Clinical) Handbook states: The aim of this assessment is to test 
students ability to evaluate aspects of the legal process raised by a case they are undertaking or have 
completed in the Law Clinic. They are expected to reflect on what the case illustrates and says about 
relevant aspects of legal processes, whether it shows these processes in a good or bad light, whether 
and in what way matters could be improved, and what implications there are for any suggested 
reforms. The student can discuss any issue or issues relevant to the Legal Process (Clinical) syllabus, 
as long as they first get permission of the Class Co-ordinator. Once you have permission to write an 
essay reflecting on a Law Clinic case, you should research it using the reading referred to in the 
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subjects like Legal Theory or Legal Process, the topics tend to be quite broad and not 
unlike an essay set by an academic except that they are sparked by an actual case. 
For instance students might explore in Legal Theory what they have learnt from an 
employment case or cases about the alleged neutrality of law and in Legal Process 
whether mediation is always an appropriate means of dispute resolution. Topics in 
substantive law subjects can also be broad, such as the common topic of evaluating 
the effectiveness of a new rent deposit scheme, but very often they are more narrow, 
reflecting the actual substantive law question the student had to research in the case. 
For instance, a recent essay in property law explored the extent to which consent of 
a co-owner is a necessary requirement in the area of law concerning repairs and 
alterations?, whereas in employment law a student asked Is the band of 
reasonable responses still effective as the determining test in unfair dismissal cases? 
If not, is there a better alternative? In this way, these essays reflect to a far greater 
extent the sort of enquiries lawyers have to make in practice as compared to the 
often artificial and unrealistic tasks involved in traditional problem questions in law.  
But apart from the possibility that, as befits the more instrumental nature of research 
in actual cases, such essays are narrower than the standard essay questions in the 
class, there are only two real differences between reflective and standard essays. One 
is that students might already have commenced research on the topic in their clinical 
reflective essay and hence will benefit from doing additional deeper research. The 
second is that they have chosen the topic out of interest or in order to assist the client 
and thus tend to put more effort into the essay. Both of these give CLLB students an 
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advantage over other students, but this needs to be offset against the fact that they 
often have very large burdens imposed on them by their case work. Moreover, 
unlike other students on the class, they have to devote time to thinking of an 
appropriate essay topic and in most cases engaging in a number of exchanges with 
myself to ensure an appropriate essay topic.  
4. Learning about Ethics and Justice - Reflective Essays 
Similar considerations apply to the very similar reflective essays which form 50% of 
the assessment in Ethics and Justice where students are simply instructed to discuss 
the relevant various justice and/or ethical aspects of a case undertaken by the 
student. However, before the student commences the essay, they will have first 
presented the case at one of the weekly one hour case surgeries that are held 
alongside more formal two hour seminars. In such surgeries students present a case 
that they think raises issues of ethics and/or justice and the discussion ensues on 
how the case might be resolved, what further issues are raised and what reading 
might be helpful in discussing the case. A topic is then set at the surgery or 
subsequently once the student has had time to conduct more research and reflection. 
But apart from this, reflective essays on ethics like those on substantive law topics 
are not that different to standard essays or, more accurately, the dissertations which 
students have to write in their Honours year. Indeed, this gives CLLB students a 
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5. Learning about Law, Life and Legal Practice  Reflective Diaries 
What is even more novel for students and what they most struggle to get to grips 
with is writing a reflective diary  often called a journal or even turned into the 
horrible gerund journaling. Diary writing starts in the second year of the CLLB 
after initial training is over. Students must produce a (roughly6 500 word) entry 
every fortnight in each semester (except in the semester when they take Ethics and 
Justice when entries are produced weekly). Half way through each semester, they 
are encouraged to hand in their entries for the first six weeks in order to obtain 
feedback. I read them and respond with the aim of getting them to think more 
deeply, raise related issues or suggest relevant reading. The students can then 
respond to these comments (in roughly 200 words) ensuring both a limited dialogue 
between us and that students take reflection more seriously knowing that it is being 
read and responded to (cf Van Tartwijk, & Driessen 2009). 
For all semesters other than those in which they take Ethics and Justice, the issues on 
which they can reflect are very broad. Thus the Handbook states:  
Relevant experiences on which you can reflect will include, most obviously, any case 
work, but also Clinic training, attendance at an IAC [Initial Advice Clinic],7 and 
attendance at surgeries. As long as it somehow illuminates one of your various clinic 
activities, you may even reflect on what you have learnt in the standard LLB from, for 
example, classes in Legal Process on access to justice, classes in Legal Theory on 
substantive justice or ethics, and any class in which you learn law relevant and helpful 
to the conducting of one of your cases.  
6 This used to be a maximum, but following feedback a maximum for each entry (and response to 
entries  see below) was replaced with an overall word limit so that students could tailor the depth of 
discussion to the significance of the issue.  
7 These are run by USLC but advice given by pro bono solicitors, usually USLC alumni.  
27 
 
                                                          
Special Issue: Problematising Assessment in Clinical Legal Education  
 
For Ethics and Justice, students are told the diary should cover the student's 
activities in handling cases and participation in case surgeries, as well as reflection 
on the student's performance, what they are learning from the class and from their 
clinical experience, and how they might improve their performance.  
Given that reflection is for most students a novel experience, many struggle to know 
what to write about and how to go about reflection. As Morin and Waysdorf also 
found, meaningful and effective reflecting requires that we teach students the 
process of reflection. (2013, 603). To this end, the CLLB commences with a session 
on the theory of clinical legal education which specifically focuses. In addition, fairly 
detailed guidance on reflection is provided in the CLLB handbook (reproduced in 
full in Appendix B, below and  repeated in a session just before students commence 
writing diaries for the first time. In addition to this guidance, students are provided 
with a number of diaries from previous years which received high marks, are invited 
to submit a diary entry as a dry run and are given face to face feedback after their 
first submission.   
But it is clear that reflection is an art which is learned from practice and with the 
help of comments on diary entries, marks and general comments at the end of each 
semester. Many students comment on their difficulties they have at the beginning of 
the process, but equally many also comment on how they have come to appreciate 
the task and have learnt from being required to reflect on their experiences. This was 
particularly so with those students who took the option of providing an introduction 
to the diaries pulling together themes and providing a retrospective analysis of their 
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growth. For example, one student provided the following overview of her years 
doing the CLLB: 
The process of keeping a diary and reflecting on case work has been a very helpful one 
in monitoring my development and learning.  By taking time out to think about what I 
have done and how I have done it has helped to prepare me for what lies ahead in the 
legal world.  I can see legal problems now as a mix of different issues which may all 
need some attention or at the very least some consideration as potentially significant 
factors in whether we will act or how we do act if we decide to. 
 I found that at the beginning of my Law Clinic experience I was concerned about 
client interactions and making sure that I was representing the clients best interests, 
and not acting in a paternalistic manner. As my experience grew in this area, and I 
began to get involved in cases which required representation, my focus turned to the 
myriad of issues which present themselves when a court or tribunal hearing looms.  
First of all is the thorny issue of who out of the co-advisors is going to do the 
representation. This is left to the co-advisors to resolve, and needs to be dealt with 
delicately. 
Preparing and representing at the hearing is obviously a highly stressful time, and it 
tests your strength of character and ability to relate to your co-advisor as well as the 
client.  Dealing with clients in these stressful situations is also challenging, and this is 
where a good relationship with your co-advisor is essential. The importance of investing 
in establishing those relationships early on cannot be underestimated, and this made a 
big difference to me when I was faced with the challenge of representation. 
As I have become more established in the Law Clinic I find that my reflections have 
turned to some of the more perplexing aspects of practitioner work: viz. what is 
substantive justice? and; can it be achieved? I am not convinced that I have found the 
answers to these questions, but what I have discovered is that there are many different 
ways of considering these questions, and that each case needs to be considered on its 
merits.  I believe that the merits of a case go beyond what the black letter law says and 
extend to a consideration of the fairness of the situation, and the ease with which the 
client can advocate on their own behalf and represent themselves in a formal setting.  I 
have discovered tensions around this issue given the finite resources that we have at 
our disposal.  This means that tough decisions need to be made about who we do and do 
not represent.   
In summary, the reflective process has caused me to consider some of the wider issues of 
client representation. It has opened my eyes to potential problem areas and 
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constraining factors which could jeopardise a clients case. Time will tell, but I believe 
this has had a major influence on my development as a learning lawyer.   
 
From this it can be seen the wide range of issues on which one student reflected  
teamwork, ethics, justice (legal, substantive and access). To these can be added 
myriad others  from more practical issues of how to effectively represent clients, the 
values of clinical legal education, career choice to highly personal experiences such 
as being the victim of a sexual assault or witnessing a murder. The opportunity for 
reflection thus prompts students to prepare for their future careers and for the rest of 
their personal life.  
The above extract from a students introduction to her diaries also shows the value 
of students not just reflecting on experiences as they occur, but also on looking back 
to see how their views and behaviour have changed and how they now see 
themselves as persons and potential professionals. Indeed, it is now compulsory 
rather than merely optional to provide an introduction to each semester of diaries in 
which they take a more holistic view of their development. The other insight I have 
gained about reflection from my students diaries is the value of the dialogue 
between myself and the student which results from my commenting on their entries. 
Such academic intervention can:  
x alert students to potentially problematic ethical and practical issues which 
they had not noticed or which if they noticed, had regarded as unproblematic; 
x expose them to new issues through imagining alternative versions of the facts 
of their cases or by asking whether a possibly immoral or impractical solution 
which they had not contemplated might ever be justified;  
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x require students to clarify for themselves the exact nature of their stance on 
particular issues;  
x refer students to relevant reading to enhance their understanding of issues; 
x encourage students to adopt new perspectives in dealing with issues, think 
more deeply and in a more sophisticated way about issues they had raised or 
justify ethical or practical positions they had taken.  
As an aside it can also be noted that reading the diaries has proved incredibly 
valuable, not just in aiding student development, but also in terms of running the 
Clinic and CLLB. For instance, having repeatedly read about the benefit of having to 
attend evening advice session staffed by pro bono solicitors, it was decided to make 
these compulsory for all first year Clinic  and not just CLLB  students.  
A final point about the diaries is that, while marking them was at least initially 
unfamiliar, it gave rise to fewer problems than marking case performance. Although 
there is no core of knowledge to be conveyed as in more standard forms of academic 
work, like traditional academic assessments one is looking for insights and the use of 
existing learning and additional research. Consequently, although it has taken a 
while to put into words, I found it relatively easily to get a feel for what is poor, 
competent, good, etc work and have subsequently, with the help of external 
examiners and others who assess diaries, developed the marking scheme set out in 
Appendix B. Ensuring reliability of assessment would be helped enormously by 
having clinical staff co-marking with me (currently I mark all diaries). This is I think 
is one of the most effective means of ensuring reproducibility of results. In my 
experience, when markers discuss with and justify to each other the marks they give 
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to the same assessment, they relatively quickly come to a fairly uniform standard. 
However, short of this, this assessment method is about as reliable as one can get in 
the context of any marking which involves making subjective evaluations.  
Moreover, it should be clear that, whatever the problems with reliability, assessment 
on the CLLB must score high in terms of validity, given that, as espoused by van der 
Vleuten and Schuwirth (2005, 312-3) clinical elements assessed are largely based on 
real-life activities or, failing that, simulated exercises based on real-life activities. In 
addition, when it comes to case performance we are interested not in discrete skills 
but in a students ability to competently perform all those skills in which 
practitioners should be competent  both technical legal skills as well as softer skills 
such as the display of empathy, care and consideration for clients. And then when it 
comes to such reflection, we are looking for student insights into an even wider 
sense of competency which extends beyond both types of skills to an awareness of 
the role of ethic and justice in the practice of law and to the development of the 
individual students sense of professional identity.   
 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, I have argued that legal competence should be about values as well as 
skills, and about ethics as well as knowledge. Similarly, CLE should aim to assist 
students become effective and ethical practitioners, and to develop their own style of 
practice and own sense of professional morality  in short their own professional 
identity. While various individual exercises and examinations can help them in this 
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regard and certainly with the acquisition of knowledge, it is reflective diaries which 
are most important in this regard.  Perhaps most importantly, the diaries encourage 
students to develop the habit of being a reflective practitioner  in other words 
lawyers who constantly reflect on what they are doing both after and also, later as 
they become more experienced, during behaviour (see eg Schön 1983, 1995). This 
process is enhanced by the fact that reflection on the CLLB occurs over a period of 
years rather than months. This opens up the possibility of students returning to 
issues they had previously encountered with similar but often subtly different 
experiences. This in turn ensures repeated circles of Kolbs learning circle and this 
may lead to the development of an increasingly nuanced theory of how to act in 
the future as subtle differences in the context in which an issue arises encourages 
adaptions to the initial theory of how to respond. I see this regularly in relation to 
ethical issues relating to the lawyer-client relationship. Indeed one students 
experience in trying to negotiate an appropriate course between paternalism, which 
she first unwittingly displayed before being exposed to ethical theory, and acting in 
the clients best interests, which she completely ignored in her next case due to the 
desire to prioritise client autonomy, led her to write, part-time while working as a 
lawyer, a dissertation on the subject - surely a supreme example of life-long learning! 
In any event, even if such repeated reflection on the same issue does not occur, the 
process of regular reflection throughout the law degree is likely to make reflection a 
habitual aspect of the students make-up which in turn is likely to enhance their 
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competence in both its traditional narrower manifestations as limited to skills and its 
wider manifestations as argued for in this article.  
 
I would like to thank Cees van der Vleuten for his very helpful and informative 
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Appendix A - Marking Criteria for Cases 
Your case should be conducted and your files maintained in accordance with the rules and 
guidance contained in the Law Clinic Handbook, in particular the Practice Rules and the Law 
Clinic Guide. These documents contain a step by step guide on how to handle a case 
including, for example, the requirements relating to communication with your client, how 
your paperwork should be managed and what should be recorded on the electronic case 
management system. The table below gives an indication of the criteria used for marking your 
files. 
 Unsatisfactory Competent Excellent 
Communication Infrequent, lacking in 
clarity and inappropriate. 
Failure to respond  
within reasonable time 
Regular, clear and 
appropriate with 
reasonable response time 
Frequent, clear  and 




Poor record of work 
undertaken with no 
evidence of research, 
failure to print e-mails 
etc., missing papers from 
file, papers not kept 
neatly or in proper order, 
failure to record work on 
CMS, poor 
communication with co-
advisors and/or staff. 
Accurate record of work 
undertaken with some 
evidence of research, 
paper files adequately 
maintained, CMS up to 
date and accurate and 
good communication 
with co-advisors and 
staff. 
Clear, accurate and up to 
date record of all work 
undertaken including 
research, calls, e-mails 
etc., all papers filed 
correctly and neatly, CMS 
up to date and accurate, 
excellent communication 





Little or no evidence of 
relevant research, poor 
understanding of law 
with poor analysis of 
legal position, poor 
explanation of law to 
client and little or no 
awareness of practical 
and procedural matters, 
poor advocacy and/or 
negotiating skills  
Evidence of relevant 
research, good 
understanding of law and 
good analysis of facts and 
application of relevant 
law, good explanation of 
law to client and good 
awareness of practical 




Evidence of extensive 
and thorough relevant 
research, excellent and 
accurate analysis of facts 
and application of 
relevant law, very clear 
explanation of law to 
client and excellent 
awareness of practical 




Drafting  Poor drafting of letters, 
summons, ET1s and 
other legal documents 
lacking in clarity, 
containing irrelevant 
material and factual 
inaccuracies 
Clear, concise, accurate 
and relevant drafting of 
letters, summons, ET1s 
and other legal 
documents 
Very clear, concise, 
relevant and accurate 
drafting of letters, 
summons, ET1s and 










provided, but also caring 
and sensitive to their 
needs, and prepared to 
go the extra mile 
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Unaware of any relevant 
ethical problems 
Aware of most ethical 
problems but simplistic 
solution to the problems 
provided 
Aware of all relevant 
ethical problems and 
sophisticated and 




Poor awareness or insight 
into difficulties presented 
in case, personal 
performance or any 
ethical issues arising  
Good awareness of 
difficulties presented in 
case, personal 
performance, any ethical 
issues arising. 
Excellent awareness of 
difficulties presented in 
case, personal 




1. The above categories of unsatisfactory, competent and excellent broadly translate 
into a mark of, respectively, less than 40%, between 40-69% and over 70. 
2. You will not be marked equally on each of the criteria; some are more important than 
others, and some, such as ethical awareness, or negotiation or advocacy skills, may be 
inapplicable.   
 
Appendix B  Guidelines on the Reflective Diary 
Introduction 
Writing a Diary is an exercise in extended reflection on experience. It involves at least three 
aspects of Kolbs learning cycle:  
x having a concrete experience,  
x reflection on that experience  
x the development of a new, or adjustment of an old, theory (what he calls abstract 
conceptualisation)  
Moreover, if similar experiences are repeated within relevant period of reflection it might also 
involve a fourth  active experimentation. This involves the application of a new theory of 
action, thought, feelings or values to a new experience relevant to the first one. Accordingly, a 
diary entry should involve at least three elements (with active experimentation possibly 
coming up in a late entry, allowing for further reflection, abstract conceptualisation, etc).  
 
What?    
Here you want a clear, focused and engaging description of experience or at most two 
experiences. Relevant experiences on which you can reflect will include, most obviously, any 
case work, but also Clinic training, attendance at an IAC, and attendance at surgeries. As long 
as it somehow illuminates one of your various clinic activities, you may even reflect on what 
you have learnt in the standard LLB from, for example, classes in Legal Process on access to 
justice, classes in Legal Theory on substantive justice or ethics, and any class in which you 
learn law relevant and helpful to the conducting of one of your cases. If you are unsure 
whether a particular experience is worthy of reflection for the purpose of writing a diary 
entry, you should contact the CLLB Director.  
Choose an experience/experiences which most engage you and/or are which lend themselves 
to deep reflection and theory development: something that was, for example, shocking, 
pleasing, embarrassing, disappointing, unexpected, etc and/or which made your change your 
views, values, ways of doing things etc; something that lead to self-appraisal, some form of 
change and/or personal growth (in emotions, understanding, values, experience, etc). You are 
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strongly advised to discuss one or two issues in great detail rather than skate over a few in 
superficial detail.  
  
So what?  
This involves deep reflection on what the experience(s) meant in terms of ideas, emotions, 
skills and capacities, and/or values. Ask yourself what did the experience mean to you, what 
did you learn, how did you feel before, during and after the experience, what went well or 
less well than you expected or could be expected. In short, ask yourself how has the 
experience changed me, my ideas, my values, my future plans, etc? What did you think/feel 
before and how do you think/feel now; how does it compare with what you already know 
from previous experiences, what others have told and what you learnt through study, how 
did such learning help you understand (or not understand) your experience? Here you can 
reflect on the implications for further study, for your clinic experience, future career, etc. In 
other words, what does the experience(s) tell you about legal education, legal practice, justice, 
ethics, society, other people, etc.  
 
Now what?  
What does your reflection means for the future:  
x what will you do, think or feel differently? 
x how can you go about making further improvements or changes:  
x what literature can you read, course go on, what person can you speak to  or indeed 
what do these already consulted sources tell about what you need to do? 
 
General  
Ensure that the dairy entries are well-written, well-punctuated, grammatical, clearly 
structured, free of typos, etc. You should strive for the same levels of written communication 
as is required in essays, clinic letters, pleadings, etc. 
Ensure that diaries are submitted for comments, that you respond to comments and that 
invitations to read further or otherwise gain information are taken up.  
Ensure consistency in quality and quantity of reflection.  
 
Favourable Features of Diaries 
Discussion of experiences that lends itself to deep reflection on relevant topics 
Honest, open and non-defensive self-appraisal 
Curiosity 
Awareness of and thinking through perspectives other than ones own 
Signs of personal growth  change in thoughts, feelings and values as well as knowledge 
Symbiosis between experience, theory and learning 
Use of what taught and what read in reflection  
Strong sense of how experiences lead to new outlook on law, society, other people, being a 
lawyer, and being a human being 
 
Unfavourable features 
Badly written, e.g. unclear, ungrammatical, stream of consciousness writing, repetitive and 
waffly 
Bland and descriptive 
Over or well-under the word limit 
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No submission for comments   
No response or very thin response to comments 
 
Marking the Diaries 
In marking diaries, the following matrix will be used: 
  Unsatisfactory Satisfactory Competent Good  Excellent 











length in initial 
entries and 
responses   
Use full length, 
full response to 
all comments 
Use full length, 
full response to 
all comments 





































and only a few 
typos 
Free of all 
errors 






























































change and no 
self-disclosure 




















open to change 
Reflection on Description Mostly Fair amount of Some good Extremely 
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one or two 
insights into 
law, justice etc 
reflection on 
law, justice etc 
insights into 





x the above categories of unsatisfactory, satisfactory, etc roughly correspond to a fail, 3rd, 
2.2, 2.1 and a first.  
x the various elements are not equally weighted. For instance, elements relating to 
substance (analysis and reflection) are far more important than those relating to 
presentation. Thus really insightful entries with a few typos and even grammatical and 
spelling errors may still gain a first class mark; on the other hand, even well structured, 
perfectly written and lengthy entries which are bland and purely descriptive will struggle 
to fall into more than the satisfactory category, unless there is at least some reflection.  
Further Reading 
Casey, T. (2013-4) Reflective Practice in Legal Education: The Stages of Reflection, Clinical Law 
Review, 20, 317-354. 
Gibbs, Learning by Doing: A Guide to Teaching and Learning (1998) (electronic access) 
Maughan and Webb, Lawyering Skills and The Legal Process (2005), Ch. 2 esp, pp. 44-46 
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